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AIRLINES AND AGENTS: CONFLICT AND THE
PUBLIC WELFARE
ROBERT L. THORNTON*
C URRENT POST DEREGULATION developments in
the airline industry might result in a marked reduction
in the number of major competitors. This reduction could
be so marked as to be of concern to antitrust monitors in
the government. This article addresses these deregula-
tion developments and their effects, yet stops short of
proposing answers to questions of actual legality of the
specific steps now underway.
Deregulation does not mean that the government
ceases to interfere in an industry's operations. In most
cases, deregulation means that the government will regu-
late the industry through the standard rules applicable to
all industries and will cease to regulate it through a spe-
cific set of rules tailored to the industry in question.
When a "natural monopoly" exists, a special set of regula-
tions is essential to protect the consumer from the mo-
nopoly. Where such a monopoly does not exist, rules are
needed to prevent the development of a monopoly. Pre-
sumably, the government mandates deregulation of a pre-
viously regulated industry because some change has
occurred in the industry to make deregulation possible.
Among closely regulated industries, the airlines were
atypical. The original airline regulations were imposed
* B.A., University of Akron; M.B.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan; Chairman
and Professor of Marketing at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio; member, Interna-
tional Air Transport Association Project "Think Tank"; former Professor of Inter-
national Business at Florida State University.
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not to protect against a "natural monopoly", but to insure
the economic viability of the industry. In 1938, when the
airline industry was originally given special regulation, a
natural monopoly was not feared. At that time it was rec-
ognized that no airline could provide the desired services
without government subsidy. The regulation was imposed
to define what service would be offered and to limit the
amount of subsidy. Shortly after the end of World War II
it became obvious that technical developments had made
unsubsidized airline operations possible. Thus, deregula-
tion of the nation's airlines in 1978 was long overdue.'
Whether the natural characteristics of the unregulated in-
dustry will prevent the development of an unacceptable
concentration is yet to be determined.
I. THE INDUSTRY
The airline industry consists of the operating compa-
nies, the retailers of its product, travel agents and airline
owned sales offices, and wholesalers. It is a part of the
larger travel industry which also includes bus systems,
railroads, hotels, and rental car companies.
From a marketing point of view, there are two sharply
different segments: pleasure travelers and business travel-
ers. These two types of travelers have quite different char-
acteristics. For example, their sensitivity to price,
sensitivity to selling effort, and sensitivity to destination
differ a great deal.
A. Potential Concentrations of Power
Power could be distributed within the industry in three
possible ways, each of which carries at least the potential
for distorting the ability of the market place to protect the
public. The first of these would place power in the hands
of an oligopoly of five to ten major operating airlines.
These operators would set the prices, the operating de-
l See generally S. BAYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussion of regu-
lation theories and their reform related to the Civil Aeronautics Board).
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tails, and the margins of the separate channel members.
This concentration of power approximates that which ex-
isted under regulation. Were it to continue under dereg-
ulation, it would set prices and operating standards at a
level close to that which a monopolist would select. The
system would be high priced, high service, dependable,
and very attuned to its least price sensitive customer, the
business traveler. However, the systems would need ways
to prevent entry into the industry. This could occur, for
example, through control of airport access, airway access,
contractual control of the selling process, or through very
high costs of entry to the industry.
A second concentration of power, similar to the first,
would permit outside competitors to participate in se-
lected segments of the industry without interference. For
example, it would cede feeder and intra-small city traffic
to the scattered control of specialized operators. High
volume price sensitive travel on high pleasure travel
routes would then be the province of low service, high
volume, low image carriers. Such a development would
tend to create a "two market" industry split along price
elasticity grounds toward separate pleasure and business
components. Systems would be needed to keep the two
markets apart. These would include different service stan-
dards, different payment procedures for situations where
pleasure and business travel was to the same place, and
successful predatory price operations to keep interlopers
out of major mixed travel markets. The current market-
place seems to be moving in this direction.2
The third possible concentration of power differs dras-
tically from the first two. Under this plan, power would
be transferred to the other channel members, primarily to
travel agents. Ten to twenty large operating groups
would control access to all markets, including ancillary
ones (e.g. hotels). These operating groups would provide
2 Icahn Says Mergers Could Help to Stabilize the Airline Indusity, TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Mar. 31, 1986, at 8. According to Carl Icahn, new Chairman of TWA, "What
good are a lot of weak airlines?" Id.
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service to big customers on a continuing contract, set
margins selectively based on customer's buying power
and service demands, and, eventually, dictate schedules
and services. From an evaluation of the theory of market-
ing channels that considers today's technology, this is the
structure that would have evolved had there been no prior
special regulation. Barriers to the entry of new firms to
such a structure would be high. Thus, antitrust monitors
would need to watch carefully.
B. Power Struggle Factors
The process of airline deregulation is taking shape.
Price and route structures are no longer controlled and
entry and exit from the market are, with minor excep-
tions, in the hands of the competitors. The structure of
the channel, however, has only recently been decontrol-
led. The problems of who can sell tickets, how payments
will be allocated, and who will provide general schedule
data are only now being worked out. These factors are,
perhaps, the most important in determining the shape of
the industry when the deregulatory process is complete.
Some of these factors, however, resemble the older regu-
latory era. The final structure may thus be modified by
"power in being", a remnant of the past. Five power fac-
tors will be discussed in the following paragraphs: (1) the
existence of two markets, (2) the need for a sophisticated
clearing system, (3) the use of automated information and
reservation systems, (4) the lack of universality in any air-
line, and (5) the "power in being" advantage of the
airlines.
First, although there are clearly two markets (business
and pleasure), the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) persist-
ently treats them as one. For example, for years the CAB
I R. L. Thornton, Channel Structures Changes and Passengers Air Deregulation, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE TRANSPORTATION RE-
SEARCH FORUM 285 (1981).
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effectively barred travel agents from selling group tours. 4
As a result, the market is less developed in the United
States than in Europe.5 A channel segment which can
most flexibly provide the business and pleasure markets
with the kinds of service each requires will have a compet-
itive advantage.
A second power factor arises from the need for sophis-
ticated systems to allocate a traveler's payment among the
several airlines or other service providers on a particular
journey. One entity sells a trip; many entities provide the
services of the trip. All must receive their calculated share
of payment. The government may find it necessary to re-
lax some of the antitrust rules to permit development of a
satisfactory clearing system. Similar systems have been
developed in other industries by an outside agency. The
banking system externally developed the Master Charge
and Visa networks.6 These networks have elements of a
clearing system. Likewise, the banking industry and Fed-
eral Reserve Banks jointly operate the bank check clear-
ance system.7 It is noteworthy that during the regulation
era, the Air Transport Association, an industry trade
group, ran the clearance system under legalized suspen-
sion of the antitrust laws.8 With this system, the air carri-
ers developed power. For example, working under group
approved rules, they saw to it that no carrier could be
more or less lenient in granting credit. Thus, credit pol-
icy toward other channel members was not one of the
tools of competition. Moreover, a refusal by the airline-
dominated clearing system could absolutely prevent an
aspiring travel agency from entering the industry.
Id. Technically, group tours could be sold. Restrictions, however, were so
severe that the tours were not marketable. Id.
5Id.
6 Mastercard, Visa, and the New Kid, AM. BANKING AJ. 45 (Aug. 1985).
7 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RE-
SERVE SYSTEM, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 155-59 (3d ed. 1954).
8 Durbin, Marketing Case Passes Milepost, Appeals Court Backs CAB's Stand, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Mar. 21, 1985, at 1.
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Although the CAB kept a close watch, there was no evi-
dence of power abuse.
On January 1, 1985, deregulation of this phase of the
industry was accomplished.9 The clearance system, in-
tended for use in the future, places control solely in the
hands of the airlines. The airlines will work under the
newly established Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC),
whose Board of Directors consists of airline dominated
members. 10 The airlines unilaterally accepted this step.
Travel agent groups, on the other hand, received it with
mixed reactions." The Association of Retail Travel
Agents (ARTA) sued the Airlines Reporting Corporation
under the antitrust laws. 12. The largest travel agent
group, the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA),
supported the action despite some hesitation. 13  The
ASTA, composed principally of small travel agents, possi-
bly preferred to be oppressed by the airlines rather than
by a set of large corporate travel accounts. 14 There is no
evidence yet that the Department ofJustice or the Depart-
ment of Transportation intended to interfere openly with
this airline-developed system.15
A third factor stems from the need to provide a sophis-
ticated reservation and information system to all custom-
ers, airlines, and middlemen involved. Today, each major
airline has developed such a system separately. Thus,
9 CAB Sunset Bill Passes Despite Antitrust Question, Av. WEEK AND SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 1, 1984, at 33.
lo Airline Reporting Corporation Elects 20 Airline Officials to Board of Directors, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Oct. 11, 1984, at 3.
, Durbin, ATA Unveils Post-Immunity Plan, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June 18, 1984, at 1.
2 Durbin, Court Sets March Trial Date for ARTA's Anti-trust Suit, TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Feb. 17, 1986, at 4. According to an ARTA spokesman, ARC is developing so-
phisticated systems that could be alternatives to the travel agency distribution sys-
tem. Id.
is Durbin, ARC Moves Ahead, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Aug. 16, 1984, at 1. ASTA con-
tinues its frustration. Joseph Hallisey, Chairman of ASTA is quoted as saying,
"We are treated as the proverbial stepchild." Durbin, Hallisey: ARC Ignores Society
Interests, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Dec. 12, 1985, at 2.
14 Smaller agencies sometimes complained bitterly. See Ohio Agency Says it Signed
ARC Pact Under Duress, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Jan. 20, 1986, at 32.
5 Durbin, ARC Drops 5076 Rule, Branch Requirement For In-Plant Locations, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1984, at 1.
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American Airlines' Sabre system carries almost all other
airline's schedules as well as its own.16 The smaller trunk
and regional airlines do not always have a system. 17 Most
travel agents carry only one airline's system. Therefore,
rivalry exists between airlines to mold their own system,
preferably exclusively, to the travel agents. Each airline
developer has absorbed much of the development costs of
these systems. The airlines generally believe that the
schedule display under one airline's system will be mod-
estly biased in ways that make the travel agent more likely
to select flights offered by the system developer than by
competing airlines who list their schedules on the same
system.' 8
There has been public concern over the bias inherent in
airline developed reservation systems.' 9 An important
bias arises from the preference shown for airline travel
and for airline owned hotels.2 0 Bus systems, cruise lines,
non-airline owned hotels, and non-airline sponsored
tours are all candidates for display on airline systems, yet
they are sparsely represented. Travel agents are not pro-
vided needed information to expose adequately the cus-
tomer to non-airline oriented travel.2 ' Thus, the travel
agent is tricked into doing a poor job of meeting the cus-
tomer's needs.
lo UAL, AAL Face New Anti-trust Allegations, TRAVEL WEEKLY Jan. 9, 1986, at 2
[hereinafter Anti-trust Article].
'7 See Charging Bias, Airlines Ask CAB to Change Reservations Systems at American
United, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1984, at 29, col. 4.
,8 An anti-trust suit by ten of the "have not" airlines against American and
United, the two major "haves", provides evidence that a small amount of bias can
yield big trouble for the disadvantaged. The suit seeks damages possibly in the
billions. The suit alleges that the two majors airlines offered prices below cost for
their automated reservation systems to travel agents and acted in concert on fees.
See Anti-trust Article, supra note 16, at 2. See also Comment, The Antitrust Implications
of Computer Reservations Systems, 51J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 180-83 (1985) (discussing
system bias by computer reservations systems).
19 Clark, Eliminating Bias Could Backfire on Proponents of Rulemaking, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, July 12, 1984, at 1, [hereinafter cited as Clark].
20 Some of the major hotel networks are working on the problems by develop-
ing a system to obtain linkages to the major reservation systems. See Hoteliers De-
sign Data System to Link Airline's Computers, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1986, at 1.
21 AMTRAK on PARS/SABRE, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 12, 1984, at 2.
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When the airlines developed these systems, no non-air-
line private body capable of investing in the development
of such a system existed. One company which tried,
Tymnet, has found business difficult.22 While an airline
could subsidize the development of such an important
competitive tool and collect added revenues from prefer-
ential schedule displays, it was not practical for an in-
dependent company to do so.
The most logical channel member to develop the reser-
vation system was the travel agent industry. The travel
industry's failure to develop this system can be blamed on
the legacy of the CAB. As mentioned earlier, the CAB
thought it had the regulatory duty to increase the airlines'
economic viability. To accomplish this task the CAB sys-
tematically limited the power of travel agents. As a result,
the travel agents were fragmented, divided, and power-
less. At the time Congress instituted deregulation, the
travel agents had no power base capable of making the
investment needed to create a reservation system.23
The CAB has shown concern for the inherent bias aris-
ing from airline control of the reservation system. It has
directed remedial action to de-bias reservation displays.24
It is unlikely, however, that these steps will succeed be-
cause the pay-off of bias is high and the ways to achieve it
are subtle.25 If travel agents ran the system, and if the
agents had been forbidden to integrate vertically, then the
bias would have had little pay-off. In that situation, any
resulting bias would have been random and, thus, less
threatening.26
2 According to Travel Market Yearbook, TRAVEL WEEKLY, December 31, 1985,
Tymnet has about 1,000 reservation system CRTs in service versus American's
Sabre with over 44,000 and United's Apollo with over 32,000.
21 Godwin, ASTA Automation Unit Proposes Criteria for Malfunction System, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Nov. 15, 1984, at 110.
24 Board Moves to End Display Bias, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Feb. 16, 1984, at 1.
25 Clark, supra note 20, at 1.
2( A "Small Airline" sponsored effort to develop a "Neutral Industry Booking
System (NIBS) is said to have considered acquiring TWA's Pars as a basis for fur-
ther development of an unbiased system. This occurred during the period while
TWA was a takeover target of both Continental Airlines and of Carl Icahn. Settle-
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The Department of Justice has expressed concern over
the airline owned reservation systems as a competitive
weapon. According to their Congressional report on air-
line automation, the development of Joint Neutral Book-
ing Systems (NIBS) might falter due to high costs. The
Justice Department further stated that such programs of-
fer the best remedy for correcting any anticompetitive
practices that exist.2 7
A fourth industry factor is that no airline is universal.
This factor is a carry-over from regulation. Under regula-
tion, the CAB's policy was to prevent undue advantage
from accruing to any one airline. Thus, no airline flew to
all places, or even to most places. Such geographical spe-
cialization makes it likely that any flight will involve more
than one airline. This may mean that the originating air-
line has an insignificant role in the total flight. Where
possible, airlines will introduce a different form of bias.
When an airline originates the ticket, it will tend to route
the flight over its lines. 8 Again, a travel agent has less
reason for bias because he is not tempted to maximize
one carrier's revenue at the expense of the traveller's time
or comfort.
A fifth factor is the residue of regulation. This factor
manifests itself in a very large and powerful airline group,
and a fragmented, powerless, and leaderless "other chan-
nel member" group. The underlying reason why the air-
line industry is structured in this way is because the
financial community, the political structure, community
leaders and government regulators presume this is the
ment of TWA's fate seems to have killed the proposal, if it was ever seriously
considered. See Analyst Michael Derchin Views the Match, Barrons, Mar. 3, 1986 at
24.
27 According to the Department ofJustice, liquidated damage clauses contained
in current vendor contracts may hurt the development of neutral systems. See
Poling Justice Dept. Says NIBs Could Falter Over Costs, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Jan. 2, 1986, at1.
28 Id. The Department of Justice says that it receives complaints from
nonvendor carriers about subtle forms of discrimination including "a preference
for on-line connections over interline flights, even when the latter offers a better
departure time and/or a short trip". Id. at 4.
3791986]
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way it should be. In general, a small company has few
defenders, regardless of the logic of its case. The public
does not care if a small company gets in trouble. By com-
parison, the whole nation worries if a major company is
hurt. In addition, a large industry can amass a stronger
and a well financed lobbying effort with the public, as well
as to see that Congress gives full consideration to its
desires.
II. WARS AMONG CARRIERS AND COLLEAGUES
With the arrival of post deregulation laissez faire atti-
tudes, wars have broken out among the air carriers and
between the carriers and their channel colleagues. These
wars are fought among the trunk carriers, and between
the trunks and interlopers. Interlopers, the second form
of industry conflict, are new carriers. They have been de-
scribed above as "outside competitors exercising power
in selected segments of the market." They attack the
heavily travelled pleasure and business routes by drasti-
cally cutting prices. They do not usually attack small mar-
kets and rarely attack primarily business markets.
Interlopers do, however, attack primarily pleasure mar-
kets if the market is big enough. An example of this type
of interloper is People Express Airline.2 9
Another struggle occurs between major carriers and the
commuters. The trunks co-opted the commuters, first by
gratefully abandoning thin routes to the commuters and
then by each of them enlisting as many minor operators as
they could into segments of each trunk's hub and spoke
system discussed below. This development is an added
part of the second concentration of power mentioned
earlier.30
29 People Express has lately shifted from its original "point to point" philoso-
phy to one of being a full service airline. Levere, People Express Moves Toward Full
Service, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 5, 1986, at 1. The airline has found the change diffi-
cult. Texas Air Said to be Pursuing People Express, Wall St. J., July 3, 1986 at 3.
so Deregulation Prompts Significant Shifts in Regional Airlines, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov.
23, 1984, at 19. The major airlines have applied to their commuter link ups a set
of identifying names. Thus "American Eagle" identifies American's slaves, "The
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A. Weapons of War
The contestants have developed or adapted a set of op-
erating procedures and marketing tools used in the vari-
ous wars defined above. Most of them are selective to one
war, but some of them have applicability to several strug-
gles. The operative procedures and marketing tools are
identified and discussed below.
The airlines have adopted as their first weapon, the cre-
ation and careful management of hub and spoke systems.
A hub and spoke system consists of a set of "spoke"
routes flying to and from minor markets into major "hub"
cities. The major airline which creates the hub and spoke
system flies some of these spokes itself. Commuter, local,
or smaller airlines who the major airline has co-opted into
the system fly other spokes .3 A set of much longer and
heavier regional spokes connects major traffic hubs and
are all operated by the creator of the particular system.
Indeed, the their traffic potential of the regional spokes is
the reason behind the creation of the system.
Ideally, at the hub city, all of the small and large spokes
are centered in a small gate area of the airport. Schedul-
ing calls for a coordinated arrival of flights from all the
spokes at nearly the same time, followed at "baggage
transfer time away" by similarly coordinated departures
along all the spokes. 2 Presumably, a passenger comes
into the hub on one spoke and goes out on one of the
other major spokes to his destination. He is locked into
the hub which he enters because of the efficiency, reduced
transfer time, and convenient schedules of that system of
spokes. 3 Changing trunk carriers would probably entail a
Delta Connection", Delta's, and "Allegheny Commuter" to that of USAir. See
Two's Company, TRAVEL WEEKLYJan. 31, 1986, at 81 (article explaining these ar-
rangements in the economic survey of the travel industry).
31 AAL Eyes Commuter Network Expansion, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Nov. 5, 1984, at 6.
s For an example of the regional planning process in hub development, see
Ott, New Airline Hubs Boost Competition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 26, 1986, at
44-48.
ss See Kaldahl, Let the Process of Deregulation Continue, 50J. AIR L. & CoM. 285, 292
(1985).
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long walk with carry-on luggage and a poorly coordinated
flight availability.
The hub and spoke system works.3 4 It requires the abil-
ity to control a large number of starting gates on hub air-
ports and a sufficiently broad route structure to other
regional hubs. It results in the ability of the original trunk
to keep other trunks from pirating its passengers at plane
change stops and to limit the potential of smaller carriers
to become trunks themselves. Smaller carriers cannot
amass enough adjoining gates in sufficient amounts of air-
ports. Obviously, other trunks try to minimize the advan-
tage gained by the system initiator. The most obvious
ploy is for a competing trunk to coordinate its schedule
with the original trunk's schedule so that satisfactory con-
nections are available on either trunk simultaneously. As
a result, the situation has driven the Federal Aviation Au-
thority (FAA), to desperate measures because all airlines
want to land and take off at the same time. No one wants
the in-between times.3 5
In summary, hub and spoke systems are powerful weap-
ons in the wars "among trunks." They prevent "near
trunks" from becoming trunks, they eliminate friction be-
tween small carriers and trunks and they make the com-
muter carriers willing vassals of their protecting trunk.
While these hub and spoke systems increase travel costs,
travellers will not complain because the systems minimize
travel time and energy. From a public policy point of
view, hub and spoke systems are expensive in terms of air
34 Kelleher, Deregulation and the Troglodytes - How the Airlines Met Adam Smith, 50
J. AIR L. & CoM. 299, 312 (1985).
3 Denver's Stapleton airport provides an excellent example of the problems
which come with hubbing. Here, Continental, United, and Frontier all concen-
trate their intramountain operations each into its own hub. The resulting conges-
tion strained the system to the breaking point forcing the airport to handle
volume for which it was designed. See O'Lone, New Competition Straining Resources at
Denver's Stapleton Airport, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 24, 1986, at 40-46. As a
result, other airlines have tried to steal traffic from the "Denver Triad". In a re-
cent half page ad in the Wall Street Journal, Western Airlines used a cartoon of a
secretary telling her boss "I have booked you through Denver, sir. Maybe you'd
rather vote by proxy." Western then suggests a solution - its hub at Salt Lake
City. Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1986, at 27.
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traffic controllers' salaries and airport construction
costs.
36
A second weapon, reservation systems controlled by the
major airlines, are primarily weapons in "among trunk"
wars rather than in wars between trunks and interlopers.
They pose significant barriers to information flow and
permit less than optimum routing, pricing, and timing
flexibility for the public. These controlled reservation
systems are possible only because of "power in being". A
newly formed airline structure would not have the re-
sources to create its own airline-owned reservation sys-
tems. Thus, the existence of reservation systems
contolled by major airlines keeps the other channel mem-
bers (including smaller trunks as well as travel agents)
from developing power bases.
A third weapon, the "Financial Clearing House," is
clearly a weapon for the airlines to use against the other
channel members. Should the government look the other
way, the airlines could use this clearing house to prevent
entry of other competitors in several channel positions, to
inhibit growth of other channel members, and to discrimi-
nate in selling methods. More seriously, it provides an in-
formation system for trunks to coordinate their marketing
decisions; a system which would frighten any respectable
anti-trust watcher.
The "Financial Clearing House," the Airline Reporting
Corporation, provides data for current override systems
used by most of the major airlines. The override system
provides added compensation to those agents whose sales
share on a specific carrier is above the carrier's regional
percentage. Inevitably the override system will cause ad-
ded concentration of major airline power in the industry
and may lead to calls for united action by some agents
who are being whipsawed. This system unquestionably
tempts agents to distort booking decisions against the
best interests of the customer.
." Fink, The ATC Crisis, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. Mar. 31, 1986, at 11, 42-53.
Blum, Fighting the Battle of Bias, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 22, 1986, at 59.
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A fourth tool involves the rapidly growing Frequent
Flier programs. These provide free flights anywhere in
the donor's system (called premiums in the airline busi-
ness) in proportion to the number of cumulative miles
flown by the particular passenger on the donor's airline.
Frequent Flier programs are a form of legitimate price
cutting. Their principal advantage is that their saving
goes, not to the person who paid for the flight, but to the
passenger. For business travellers the benefits from the
program amount to a pay increase since the employer
who paid is aware of the employee's windfall. This pro-
gram is particularly attractive since the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has not yet required that the benefit be re-
ported as added income.38
The scheme has proved to be most useful to airline pas-
sengers who have very large route structures to "pleasure
travel" locations. Travel agents are aware not only of re-
quests to travel "only Airline 'A'" where I need a few
more miles before I take my wife to the Bahamas," but
also of "route me through Keokuk, it's longer." Thus, it
is a potent weapon for a selected few big operators, but a
disaster for the small airline whose routes may not include
pleasure travel cities. Unquestionably, these schemes
tend to prevent entry into the system and to endanger the
profitability of the smaller operators. These losing air-
lines have attempted to fight back by establishing jointly-
owned schemes with non-competing airlines and travel in-
dustry members to offer premiums for travel on the joint
systems.3 9
A fifth tool arises from the elimination of price controls.
Presently, travel agents and major commercial users of air
travel are engaged in a cautious minuet over contractual
systems for consolidating the travel management for a
-8 The IRS has not been ignoring the problems. It has "formally requested
comments on how to tax frequent flyer benefits, but issued no specific proposals
of its own." Virtanen, IRS Seeks Comment on Flight-Bonus Tax, TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Dec. 16, 1985, at 3.
30 Frequent Flyer Update, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Oct. 31, 1984, at 65.
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corporate customer into a single middleman. A big cus-
tomer can expect to get price breaks. A travel agent oper-
ating in all the customer's markets and consolidating a set
of several big customers could place enormous price pres-
sure on the airlines. Moreover, as several agent entities
now claim, an agent could manage a company's travel
program, solve enroute travel emergencies flexibly, pro-
vide managerial data, and make efficiency recommenda-
tions of considerable value to the customer.40  For
business travel, this particular development offers impor-
tant possibilities. First, this kind of contractual arrange-
ment requires agents to operate nationwide for large
companies. Currently, several major nationwide travel
agent groups are in operation. Woodside Group is an ex-
ample of this type of group.4' Second, this development
could destroy the airlines' "power in being" position, and
their ability to dominate the industry. The airline
counterploy is to exploit the divisions which exist between
travel agent groups. Talk of travel agent power is fright-
ening to the vast majority of agents. Most travel agents
are small operators who see disaster with the growth of
national travel agent entities. In a struggle between big
agents and big carriers, small agents would perish first.
The airlines play on the fear of this threatened group.
Their Airline Reporting Corporation has, so far, been
careful to cater to the needs of the little agent and less
attentive to the needs of the growing agency chains.42
Since the major chains are business travel specialists, air-
4o AT&T spokespeople, after a recent major planned consolidation of their
travel and entertainment operations, stated that they expected to save $50 million
on a budget of $500 million. Some of the savings were to come from manage-
ment actions tied to but not caused by travel agent consolidation. Lassiter, AT&T
Sees Savings of $50 Million from Consolidated Plan, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Jan. 23, 1986, at
1. Governments, too were interested. The State of Michigan planned to consoli-
date its $2 million account into one Detroit based agency. Virtanen, Michigan to
Award Government's First Fee-Based Contract, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1986, at 1.
4, Woodside Official Sees Handful of Members Buying Out Others, TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Apr. 11, 1985, at 1.
42 ARTA Opposed; Mixed Reaction by Other Groups, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Aug. 16, 1984,
at 1.
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line policy could split the agents into two non-competing
groups, one for pleasure and one for business.
Presently, the major airlines are at a disadvantage when
bargaining for price against a nationwide agent chain.
The airlines' ploy to reduce agent bargaining power is to
eliminate the middleman agent in commercial travel and
to bargain directly with the customer corporation to pro-
vide all of that company's reservation service. Some air-
lines have discussed this possibility.43 Their threat is
blunted because in order for the airlines to achieve this
result, the airline involved must manage almost all of the
customer's travel. Currently there is no national airline.
For this reason, big corporations could not expect to fly
most of their travel on one airline's flights. The moment
one airline schedules a traveler on another airline, its mo-
tives are suspect and its ability to manage an entire corpo-
rate travel program is less certain. The trade press has
been hinting that there are strong movements by the big
airlines to remedy this weakness. For example, an agency
executive said that United Airlines plans to expand
enough to "carry passengers from everywhere to
everywhere.'44
There is a second and less manageable reason for air-
lines to be wary in proposing direct airline-to-customer
corporation long term contracts. The airlines are not
suited to manage the retail end of pleasure travel. Plea-
sure travel demands a much larger commitment to per-
sonal interaction with the customer and involves a wide
variety of alternatives: cruises, foreign travel, cheap and
expensive hotels, as well as escorted and free-range tours.
The customer frequently needs advice, and will readily
shift destinations, types of experience, or quality levels. If
the airlines try to squeeze travel agents out of their com-
mercial travel business, the travel agents could be very
vindictive in personal travel reservations. 45 Thus, the air-
4.1 Virtanen, Negotiating Corporate Air Deals, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June 2, 1986, at 35.
14 Mass Agent Sees Evolution of Dealerships, TRAVEL WEEKLY, July 26, 1985, at 1.
45 See Banks, The Start of Revolt, FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 41. Seventy-two percent
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lines' ploy to reduce agent bargaining would succeed only
if the airlines unanimously agreed to squeeze out the
travel agents.
Consequently, a frantic race to nationalize has com-
menced between agent chains and trunk airlines. Central
management of large parts of the commercial travel mar-
ket is the victor's prize. Accordingly, from the viewpoint
of government monopoly watchers, the question becomes
which of the end points will be the best for the economy?
Prior to evaluating the conflict's impact, one needs to
reexamine the pleasure travel side of the market. Unlike
business travel, pleasure travel is extremely price elastic
because this sector of the market involves discretionary
income. For example, a trip to Florida is in competition
with buying a new car, sending your child to Oberlin, or
saving for retirement. Furthermore, pleasure travel is ca-
pable of very wide ranges of product differentiation in-
cluding, but not limited to: a cruise, Las Vegas, a tour
with friends, deluxe hotels, a Eurorail pass, or a knowl-
edgeable agent. Given this elastic market and wide differ-
entiation, monopoly is not a threat. A narrow travel agent
oligopoly is probably the preferred industry structure
from the agency point of view. Of course, while a one
competitor situation is undesirable, the classical pure
competition is a far worse alternative. For the purposes of
this study one needs to worry only about the business
travel market and its twin, the compelled personal travel
market.
B. The Possible Outcomes of War
By identifying the contestants and recognizing the
available weapons, one can not only follow the course of
of all airline tickets are sold by travel agents. Airlines' costs of doing business
through travel agents continue to rise because airlines are afraid of "tackling the
power of agents." See id. at 42. Frontier Airlines retracted from limiting agents'
commissions when its load factor decreased. See id. United Airlines suffered a
similar threat of agents shifting passengers. See id. United has become 100%
committed to selling airline tickets through travel agents. Id.
1986] 387
388 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
the struggle, but also predict a possible outcome. From a
public policy standpoint two possibly threatening out-
comes can be suggested: (1) a major oligopoly of airlines
which dominate the industry or, (2) a major oligopoly
composed of very large integrated travel agents who exer-
cise monopoly power.
1. An Airline Oligopoly
The hub and spoke concept seems to be a potent
weapon, primarily where an airline possesses hubs lo-
cated in key traffic generating cities combined with spokes
that cover most minor destinations. A traveler would
leave an airline's system only if alternatives were not avail-
able. As an airline grows in geographic coverage, it would
be more likely to have originated the traffic. Due to the
high entry costs to hubs, latecomer airlines would have
difficulty in securing gates, takeoff-landing slots, and com-
muter partners. A maximum of two or three major air-
lines obtaining a hub in a major city would be the limit.46
Of course, while there would be many more airlines than
the major trunks, the former would be serving commuters
by providing thin service to small places, even with using
their patron airline's gates. However, these commuter-
oriented airlines growing into major contenders would be
improbable.
The picture changes, however, when one analyzes the
way the hub concept affects today's environment. Today
no airline runs more than two or three hubs. One airline
maintains a hub in most high traffic cities. New entries,
while big at some hubs, would face problems when they
expanded. Due to the scarcity of gates, slots and com-
muter slaves, these new entries would find the expansion
very expensive. In such cases, one would expect the
growth seeker to search for alternatives. A hub is attrac-
tive because it has the following two traffic characteristics:
40 See supra note 25 for a discussion of Denver's airport problems due to hub
systems.
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(1) volumes of direct traffic originating at one hub city
and going to another and (2) a strong feeding of in-transit
traffic from nearby small cities to the rest of the world. In
most cases, which hub city a small community will send its
traffic through depends on the quality of the hub's con-
nections. An aggressive airline could probably use a less
traffic intense city in which to establish a hub. Given sev-
eral aggressive competitors developing alternate hubs at
smaller cities, the original large hub could lose some of its
small city "feed" to the new alternate hubs. In other
words, the airline originally "owning" the large city
"feed" would lose some of its traffic. An additional pres-
sure would bear on the airline originally owning the
"great hub." A direct hub-to-hub traffic would be fair
game for a point to point oriented specialist such as Peo-
ples Airline. Consequently, such a specialist would only
cater to "one hop" passengers and would not need any
specific times or gates.
The current situation in Atlanta illustrates the struggle
for a prize location. In Atlanta, Delta Airlines, the origi-
nator of the hub concept, so completely dominates the At-
lanta airport that it dominates the entire Southeast
region. The major trunks, American and United, while
desperately needing a successful Southeast hub have prin-
cipally East-West oriented routes. If these two airlines are
to become nationwide, they must obtain a Southeast re-
gion hub. Unfortunately, Atlanta is, at the moment, "too
tough to crack". To solve its problem, American Airlines
is setting up hubs at both Nashville and at Raleigh-Dur-
ham.47 With American's strong overall market power,
these hubs will inevitably draw traffic from Atlanta. It is
possible American is hoping to weaken Delta's position
sufficiently enough to attempt a future frontal attack on
Atlanta. Surely American would prefer Atlanta if the cost
was manageable. Currently, United is developing a hub at
Dulles International Airport in Washington D.C. possibly
47 Derchin, Analyst Discusses Hubbing of America, TRAVEL WEEKLY, July 25, 1985, at
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aimed at Southeast coverage. 4 However, Washington
may be too far north and the Atlanta goal a long term
objective.
There are other strategies which a major airline might
use to secure a hub. First, an airline might persuade the
government to enlarge the target city's airport as this
would reduce gate pressures. However, this solution is
dependant on the government's money.4 9 Second, one
might merge with an airline already in place on the target
hub. For example, the putative TWA-Continental
merger 50 would have provided Continental with a New
York hub, now owned by TWA. Furthermore, the in-pro-
cess merging of Eastern with Continental5 I automatically
joins Continental's attractive western hubs, with Eastern
Airlines eastern hubs, including a prized one in Atlanta.52
Third, an airline might buy or trade for a hub. The TWA-
Continental merger might have rendered TWA's St. Louis
hub useless because Continental already had hubs at
Houston and Denver.
Regulators will recognize that in a well developed sys-
tem of hubs, the cost of entry for a new trunk airline (not
a specialist) would be prohibitive.5 3 Failure to obtian stra-
tegic hubs might even remove a strong airline from com-
petition, by either failure or, more likely, merger.54 The
48 New Airline Hubs Boast Competitor, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 27, 1986, at
44.
49 Denver's Stapelton Airport is scheduled to be replaced by a new one in about
1995.
50 Levere, TWA, Texas Air OK Agreement to Merge, Thwarting Icahn Bid, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, June 20, 1985, at 1.
11 DOT Calls Off Hearing on Texas Air-Eastern Link, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June 16,
1986, at 5.
-11 Donlan, Preparing for A Take-off Eastern Will Lift Texas Air Into the No. 1 Slot,
Barrons, Mar. 3, 1986, at 9.
.13 According to Barrons, the value of one slot (the right to a period of time
sufficient for one take off or one landing) at Washington National is $400,000; at
O'Hare, $200,000. Donlan, Golden Gates: Landing Slots a Windfallfor the Airlines, Bar-
rons, Feb. 24, 1986, at 13.
.4 Systems for allocating new slots are the subject of a lot of attention from
government monitors. The Justice Department opposing the planned Northwest-
Republic merger, stated that it would leave the merged line with control of 80%
of the 63 gates at Minneapolis. Koten, Justice Department Objects to Proposal of
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process may take ten years or more, but it is possible that
the number of major competitors might be reduced to
four or five. If the number of major competitors went be-
low ten, the concentration of power might have unfortu-
nate results on the price and quality of service.
A second weapon, airline-owned reservation systems,
also needs examination. As these systems develop, it is
clear that two or three of them are slowly driving out the
others.5 5 The aggressors are Pars (TWA), Sabre (Ameri-
can), and Apollo (United); the other systems are on the
defensive. While the offensive systems undoubtedly give
their owners a lead, the lead is not "survival threatening".
Were the lead to become "survival threatening", the dy-
namics of the system might correct it; agent power, if de-
veloped, could counter with non-airline owned systems,
protection agency clients from getting less than optimum
routings. Airline-owned reservation systems are a threat
both in the war between agents and airlines and in the
struggle between airlines.
The "Financial Clearing System" weapon is significant
in the war between airlines and channel members. It
should be neutral among airlines unless intentional, bla-
tant conspiracy is involved. The "Frequent Flyer"
weapon provides certain airlines with advantages over
their competitor airlines. As the programs were originally
set up, they could threaten the existence of several trunks
on a long term basis. They unquestionably help the com-
petitor with the biggest system and can destroy a smaller
Purchase to Republic, Wall St.J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 8. TheJournal then editorially said
that a similar concentration would occur at St. Louis (56 of 74 available gates) if
the TWA-Ozark Airline merger were to be completed. Id. The Senate entered the
arena. 132 CONG. REC. 53292 (Daily ed, Mar. 25, 1986) (statement by Sen. Kas-
sebaum). The Senate has recently approved an amendment to a Transportation
Department rule that will bar an air carrier's sale of slots. McGinley, Senate Acts to
Bar Air Carriers Sale of Landing Rights, Wall St.J., Apr. 14, 1986, at 14. The House
Aviation Committee chaired by Rep. Leon Mineta (D. California) will next con-
sider the amendment. Id.
-1 Pan American has recently given up on its Panama Reservation System and
will adopt American Airline's SABRE system. Chipkin, Pan Am Will Use Sabre, Share
AAL's Bonus Plan, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Apr. 28, 1986, at 1.
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airline's viability, at least where business travel is con-
cerned. They depend on a sympathetic Internal Revenue
Service, 56 first, for their power, and then on airline domi-
nation of the channel. If this system is threatened, fre-
quent flyer programs could lose their potency. To
illustrate, presume the current skirmishes between the air-
lines and the travel agent groups is decided in favor of
allowing one travel agent entity to contract with a particu-
lar corporation to handle all of its travel at a reduced
price. The corporation staff member handling the con-
tract would almost certainly trade away the frequent flyer
bonuses for better overall prices from the travel agent. A
powerful agency chain could then defeat the airlines' fre-
quent flyer weapon.
To summarize, the probability of the development of an
airline cartel so narrow as to threaten the consumer's best
interest is reasonably high. On the other hand, should an
agent oligopoly develop, it might serve to limit the risk
through its countervailing power.
2. An Agent Oligopoly
An agent oligopoly would have to establish its market
place advantages over an airlines dominated system.
There are several reasons why the agent offers the con-
sumer a better service. The most important of these is the
inherently consumer orientation of an agent. He is not
bound by the need to maximize one form or one means of
travel. His success depends on his ability to please his cli-
entele, regardless of where, when, or how they travel. He
has no mode preferences, no place preferences, no time
preferences, or status hang-ups. The travel agent is uni-
versal in almost all dimensions. Such generalization
would be difficult to develop in an airline run system, and
even more difficult to maintain. A traveler's lack of built-
in bias can be a prized attribute.
-- According to Travel Weekly, "some airline executives have said that taxation
of program benefits would mean the end of the programs." IRS to Propose Rules on
Taxing Bonuses for Frequent Flyers, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Apr. 23, 1985 at 1.
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On the other hand, the travel agent has little to offer
the regular traveler who goes from New York to Boston
every Tuesday and Thursday. Such a traveler may not
need the extra expense of versatility. Ticketron, tele-
phone, and pay on board sales are also viable ways to cut
an agent out of the picture. Nevertheless, there is no rea-
son why the agent, if sophisticated enough, cannot tailor
his service to handle different demands with lower or
higher costs of production.
Both agents and airlines will have problems in provid-
ing geographical dispersion of sales offices. Airlines will
have to depend on agencies for their dispersed location
sales. All airlines should not set up sales offices in Butte,
Montana. Central ownership of a nationwide chain with
owned outlets would be most efficient, but the cost to
cover all locations would be unmanageable. To date, two
separate types of chains have appeared. One chain is cen-
trally owned while the other is contractual. Mixtures of
the two forms of chains are less common.58 Pragmatically,
a major chain could become a group of outlets, some
owned, some franchised, and some unattached. Agent
system managers may be concerned, however, with the
risk of anti-trust problems if they bargain jointly for
franchised members of a chain.
The travel agents' most important weapon in the war
against the trunk airlines is their offer for centralized cor-
porate travel management. The services that a universal
travel agent could offer a corporation and the bargaining
power that such a major chain could wield against the
suppliers of travel services is impressive. The agencies
are rapidly going nationwide.59 The agencies offer attrac-
tive services such as twenty-four hour availability, guaran-
teed lowest cost, quick emergency traveller
57 Schleier, Will Consortiums Combine?, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 16, 1986, at 40 (a
survey of business travelers).
5H Data on major chains, both consortia and owned, are contained in TRAVEL
MARKET YEARBOOK (Travel Weekly 1985).
' The Big Get Bigger, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 22, 1985, at 14.
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reprogramming, and auditable travel decisions. Given the
importance of centralized reservation systems, agency
chains would develop their own bias-free reservation sys-
tem once they are big enough to afford the cost. Agencies
have nothing to gain from providing less than the best to
their customers.
Finally, an agent oligopoly would turn the financial
clearing system upside down. When small and widely
scattered agents disappear, a clearing system less complex
than the Airline Reporting Corporation will be needed.
Recently, the airlines have shown signs of using their con-
trol of the financial system to influence the character of
the agency system. Their approach is to favor the small
agent in order to make it difficult for agency chains to gain
the universality they need. 60 Even today, acting without
collusion, agents can unintentionally destroy an airline.6 '
With seven or eight major agency chains, effective control
of the financial system will no longer be an airline
prerogative.
A travel world dominated by a set of travel agents may
not present a grave risk to the public. Diverse kinds of
advice are needed, and the complexity of the demand is
such that many different types of services would be possi-
ble. Specialization in areas of travel would develop. The
result could be a progress creating a kind of monopolistic
competition rather than an unimaginative and indifferen-
tiated price fixing oligopoly.
III. CONCLUSION
The possibility of consumer threatening concentrations
of power within the travel industry is predictable. First,
it is possible that the number of airline competitors could
be reduced enough to threaten the general welfare of the
industry. Entry into the airline industry can no longer be
Pestronk, The Hidden Hand of ARC, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 22, 1985, at 14.
Retailers Welcome Braniff Trust Fund but Question Effects, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June
14, 1984, at 1. Braniff Airlines has blamed travel agents for some of its problems.
Id. The airline claims that certain agents avoided booking their flights. Id.
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assured except in special cases. An industry newcomer
would face violent price competition on his few target
routes, subsidized for the oligopoly by comfortable profits
on unthreatened routes. A classically unimaginative,
technically stagnant, and dangerous oligopoly could
result.
Likewise, an agent concentration could develop, partic-
ularly in the commercial travel market. This concentration
might not be a dangerous one because there is product
differentiation. Indeed, the result might provide high
quality, cheap service to consumers. Thus, of the two
concentrations, one is likely to develop and would be dan-
gerous if it did, while the other is less likely to develop but
would not be threatening should it occur.
Although the risk of unsatisfactory concentration in the
airline industry exists, it is unlikely to develop soon. No
airline to date has achieved universality, since it would be
expensive and would require extensive investment and
rights negotiations. On the other hand, should the univer-
sality goal be reached it will be difficult to undo.
While no direct recommendations have been made in
this article, there is a variety of ways in which to prevent
the dangerous cartel. These preventative techniques in-
clude denial of merger proposals and removing reserva-
tion and payment systems from airline control. The time
to act upon these is now, before irreversible develop-
ments make deregulation of the industry necessary to pro-
tect the consumer.
The Justice Department has shown more concern about
the developing merger movements within the industry
than has the Department of Transportation. 62 Unfortu-
nately, the Justice Department has based its analyses on a
market study of the effect of proposed developments.
This analysis is similar to the one used by the CAB when
112 Congressman: Airline Mergers Ought to be Decided by Justice Department, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, May 16,1986, at 98; see also, DOT Unit Backs Planned Merger of Northwest
and Republic, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June 5, 1986, at 53.
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they evaluated mergers.63 However, such an analysis is
not viable. When market entry or exit is uncontrolled, de-
termination of an undue concentration of power can only
come from a macro study of a corporation's ability to sup-
press competition and gain its ends when unfettered by
other corporate or government power.
The Department of Transportation, the final judge of
the merger movement, has yet to show how it will analyze
the problem. The merger movement within the industry is
advancing at a rapid pace. For this reason, it seems time
for the Department of Transportation to act. If they fail
to act soon, the number of effective competitors in the air-
line industry may fall below the point from which decon-
centration is possible without a major crisis.
' CAB Find Competition Needed on Miami-Los Angeles Route, Wall St. J., Jan. 24,
1978, at 16, col. 1.
